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Abstract
Import tariff receipts represent an important share of government revenues in many devel-
oping countries and there has recently been a surge in empirical studies showing how evasion
in this ﬁeld is a pervasive phenomenon. In the case of import tariffs, the tax base is the prod-
uct of quantity and unit value, both of which have to be reported and need to be assessed by
the custom authority during an audit. I show that when the ﬁscal authority has an imperfect
detection technology, there is an additional incentive for the taxpayer to underdeclare, as a
greater declaration in one dimension actually increases the ﬁne when evasion in the other di-
mension is detected, and a tax base presenting this feature is subject to more evasion compared
to a tax base that can be assessed directly. Also, when enforcement capacity is low, voluntary
compliance is higher when the importer is required to declare only the total value of imports.
JEL Codes: F13, H26, H27, K42, O17, O24
Keywords: tariff, tax evasion, multiplicative tax base, imperfect detection, low administra-
tive capacity
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Import tariff receipts represent an important share of government revenues in many developing
countries and there has recently been a surge in empirical studies showing how evasion in this ﬁeld
is a pervasive phenomenon. One peculiar feature of import tariffs is that evasion can take place
through "underreporting of unit value, underreporting of taxable quantities, and the mislabelling
of higher taxed products as lower-taxed products" (Fisman and Wei, 2004). In particular, in the
case of import tariffs, the tax base is the product of quantity and unit value. The aim of this paper
is to explore the implications of this feature for the tariff evasion decision by importers and for
government revenues.
The importance of tariff receipts for developing countries is highlighted by the data collected
by Baunsgaard and Keen (2010). As reported in Jean and Mitaritonna (2010), "the share of trade
tax revenue in total tax receipt over the period 2001-2006 amounted on average to 2.5% in high-
income countries, 18.1% in middle-income countries and 22% in low-income countries". Recent
empirical studies have found tariff evasion to be widespread. This literature usually exploits dis-
crepancies in trade ﬂows as recorded by the exporting and the importing country and interprets
the correlation between these trade gaps and tariff rates as evidence of tariff evasion taking place.
Fisman and Wei (2004) look at trade between Hong Kong and China in 1997-1998 and ﬁnd that a
"one-percentage-point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 3 percent increase in evasion".
Javorcik and Narciso (2008) use data on trade between Germany and ten Eastern European coun-
tries during 1992-2003 and ﬁnd that a "one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated
with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase
in the case of differentiated products". Mishra et al. (2008) exploit a major tariff reform in In-
dia in the 1990s and ﬁnd a "robust positive elasticity of evasion with respect to tariffs". Jean and
Mitaritonna (2010) use a large panel dataset including observations for 75 countries in 2001 and
2004 and ﬁnd that "evasion of custom duties in larger in poorer countries" and that in the poorest
countries "a one percentage point higher tariff is found to be associated on average with import
1understatement by one percent or more". They also report the results of several studies showing
how in many African countries collection of custom duties is very poor (the worst reported case is
the Democratic Republic of Congo, with "80% of custom taxes not being collected"). Thus, tariff
receipts are an important source of revenues for the public ﬁnances of developing countries and, at
the same time, tariff evasion seems to be particularly signiﬁcant in these countries.1
Since theseminal contributionby Allinghamand Sandmo (1972), the theoreticalanalysis oftax
evasion has mainly been focused on individual decision makers dealing with personal income tax,
withsomemorerecentstudieslookingattaxnoncompliancebybusinesses(forareviewofthisvast
literature see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002; Slemrod, 2007).
Generally, the assumption is that the tax base is represented by a number, y, and the taxpayer’s
report by a possibly different number, x, with evasion being the difference between the two. I will
refer to this as the "unitary tax base" case. This way of modelling the tax base is problematic when
dealing with tariff evasion given that, as mentioned above, one distinctive feature of import tariffs
is that the tax base is the product of quantity and unit value and that evasion can concern each of
the two dimensions, plus the misclassiﬁcation of goods.
To the best of my knowledge, no theoretical analysis of the tax evasion when tax liability is
the product of several independently reported variables has been conducted so far. This overlook
of the literature may be due to the fact that generally tax evasion has been modelled by assuming
perfect detection of the true tax liability in case of an audit by the tax authority. In this case,
whether the tax base is unitary or the product of several independently reported variables is indeed
irrelevant. I will show that it does however matter when detection is imperfect, i.e. when the tax
authority does not discover for sure the true tax liability in case of an audit.2 In particular, with
a standard unitary tax base, a greater declaration has the advantage of reducing the expected ﬁne,
but the disadvantage of paying a higher tax and the taxpayer trade-offs these two effects when
1Evidence of tariff evasion has been found also for developed countries with a low level of corruption: Stoyanov
(2009) analyzes trade between Canada and the US in 1989 and ﬁnd that "tariff rates have a strong and signiﬁcant effect
on the apparent trade gap among the two".
2There is a related literature considering the implications of the fact that the tax base is not perfectly observed. See
Slemrod and Traxler (2010) for a recent contribution.
2optimally deciding how much to declare. In case of a multiplicative tax base, there is an additional
disadvantage of a greater declaration in one dimension in that it increases the ﬁne when evasion
in the other dimension is detected. This additional effect is not present when the full extension of
evasion is discovered in case of an audit, as is usually assumed.
Clearly, the assumption of perfect detection is problematic: as Slemrod (2007) puts it, "any
given examination is not perfect". This is supported by the empirical studies by Feinstein (1991)
and Erard (1997), who have shown that nondetection is indeed a serious issue. Andreoni et al.
(1998), in their review on tax compliance, summarize these ﬁndings by stating that during TCMP3
audit "IRS examiners detect approximately one out of every two dollars of evasion". Given the
intensive nature of TCMP audits, the problem is likely to be even more serious in other cases.
Feldman and Slemrod (2007) motivate their use of unaudited tax returns to estimate tax noncom-
pliance by the fact that "there are sources of income that even the most intensive audit would have
difﬁculty in detecting" and cite an IRS study that found that "for every dollar of underreported
income detected by TCMP examiners without the aid of third-party information documents, an-
other $2.28 went undetected". The issue of imperfect detection is plausibly even more relevant for
developing countries, where administrative capacity is generally low.
In this paper, I use a model of evasion with imperfect detection and study the implications of
having a multiplicative tax base. What I ﬁnd is that a tax base that is the product of two different
parameters is subject to higher underreporting compared to a tax base that can be assessed directly.
I also show that requiring an unitary declaration of a multiplicative tax base, i.e. requiring the
importer to declare only the total value of imports, even if quantity and unit value need to be
separately assessed during an audit, increases voluntary compliance when enforcement capacity is
low as this mitigates the impact of the additional incentive to underreport described in the previous
paragraph. Clearly, this also reduces the enforcement ability of the tax authority, but may be
optimal for a revenue-maximizing government when the penalty faced by the taxpayer in case
evasion is detected does not translate one-to-one into higher government revenues.
3Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, a program of intensive audits conducted by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) on a stratiﬁed random sample of returns.
3This paper deals with import tariffs, however, the applicability of the model is more general
as the tax liability is the product of several independently reported variables in other situations.
For instance, the base for property taxes is often determined, in particular in developing countries,
according to an area-based approach, where the tax base is the product of the taxable area of the
property and unit values (e.g. rental or capital value per square meter) based on factors such as
location, servicesavailable, andqualityofthestructure(Bahletal., 2008). Similarissuesarisewith
regard to the enforcement of individual transferable quota (ITQ) in ﬁsheries, in which "[f]ishers
may fail to report their harvest, or misreport its weight. When a report is ﬁled, they may attempt
to report the species taken as some other species with a lower quota value." (Johnson, 1995).
Thus, also in this case underreporting may concern unit value (quota value) and taxable quantities
(weight).
The next section outlines the imperfect detection model with an unitary tax base. The following
section extends the model to the multiplicative case, while in section 4 the two are compared.
Section 5 analyzes the case of an unitary declaration of a multiplicative tax base. The last section
concludes.
2 Unitary tax base
Here, I model tariff evasion using the "standard" approach, i.e. considering that import value has
to be declared as a single number. This is, for instance, the approach taken by Mishra et al. (2008)
and by Jean and Mitaritonna (2010). Beside introducing the imperfect detection technology (see
also Tonin, 2010), the results obtained here can be compared to the multiplicative case, analyzed
in next section, where import value is declared as the product of quantity and unit value.
Consider a ﬁrm who faces an ad valorem tariff duty t 2 (0;1) on an exogenously given import
y. The importer declaration to the custom authority is denoted by x. If x = y, there is full
compliance; if x = 0, there is full evasion, i.e. outright smuggling, and if x 2 (0;y), there is
partial evasion.
4The custom authority may perform an audit to ﬁnd out whether the importing ﬁrm complies
with custom regulation. I assume there to be an exogenously given probability of an audit being
performed, ￿ 2 [0;1]. A ﬁne proportional to the amount evaded is imposed in case evasion is
detected. However, the fact that an audit is performed does not imply that the authority with
certainty discovers the true liability. Instead, it may ﬁnd evidence to impute an import value of
^ y 2 [0;y], where y is the true value of the shipment.
I assume that ^ y is distributed over the support [0;y] according to pdf h(￿) and cdf H(￿), so that
H(0) = 0 and H(yi) = 1, and H(￿) does not depend on x.4 To simplify the discussion, I assume
that h(￿) > 0 within the support, so that H(￿) is invertible within [0;y].
Given a declaration of x and collected evidence of an import value of ^ y, the custom authority
imposes, in case ^ y > x, the payment of ￿t(^ y ￿ x), consisting of tariff duties plus an additional
ﬁne proportional to the assessed evasion, thus ￿ > 1. This speciﬁcation of the ﬁne, proportional
to the amount evaded, follows Yitzhaki (1974). In case ^ y ￿ x, the custom authority cannot prove
any evasion, so no ﬁne is imposed.5 Given a true import value y and a reported one x 2 [0;y], the
expected ﬁne in case of auditing, f, is
f = t￿
y Z
x
(^ y ￿ x)h(^ y)d^ y. (1)
The ﬁrm is risk-neutral and maximizes its expected proﬁts. For simplicity, I disregard other costs
unrelated to custom duties. Therefore, the optimal declaration is given by
x
￿ s:t: max
x2[0;y]
y ￿ ￿f ￿ tx. (2)
4The assumption is that the authority cannot assess and upheld in court a liability higher than the true one. To
extend the model to situations where this may not be the case, due for instance to ambiguity in the law, would be
straightforward.
5An equivalent narrative is that in an audit, the custom authority may ﬁnd no evidence at all of evasion with
probability H(x), which is increasing as the liability declared to the authorities increases. Conditional on detection
taking place, the density for any given level of import value ^ y 2 [x;y] being discovered is given by h(^ y)=[1 ￿ H (x)].
5After substituting (1) into (2), the ﬁrst-order condition is
H(x
￿) = 1 ￿
1
￿￿
() x
￿ = H
￿1
￿
1 ￿
1
￿￿
￿
.
The second-order condition, ￿t￿￿h(x) < 0, is always satisﬁed. The boundary condition x ￿ y is
always satisﬁed. Notice that full compliance (i.e. x = y) does not take place unless ￿￿ ! +1.
The condition x ￿ 0 implies that full evasion will take place, i.e. x = 0, when enforcement is very
weak, i.e. ￿￿ ￿ 1. To simplify the notation, the two enforcement parameters are summarized by
￿ ￿ 1=(￿￿). To summarize, the solution to the reporting problem is given by
x
￿ =
8
> <
> :
H￿1 (1 ￿ ￿) if ￿ < 1
0 if ￿ ￿ 1
. (3)
As @￿=@￿ < 0 and @￿=@￿ < 0 , in an interior solution, the fraction of the value of the shipment
that is evaded decreases as enforcement improves either because of more frequent audits or heav-
ier penalties. The equilibrium ﬁne, f￿, is given by substituting (3) into (1). Expected proﬁts in
equilibrium are then given by
￿
￿ = y ￿ ￿f
￿ ￿ tx
￿. (4)
To obtain a closed form solution, from now on I will assume h(￿) to be uniform in the support
[0;y], i.e. ^ y s U[0;y]. The expression for the expected ﬁne becomes
￿f = ￿t￿(y ￿ x)
2=(2y): (5)
Thus, the cost of evasion is quadratic in the amount of evasion, y ￿ x. The optimal reporting
behavior given by (3) becomes
x
￿ =
8
> <
> :
(1 ￿ ￿)y if ￿ < 1
0 if ￿ ￿ 1
: (6)
6So, the model implies that what is revealed to the authorities is a fraction of the true import value
that depends on the enforcement parameters. Using (5), the expected ﬁne is given in equilibrium
by
￿f
￿ =
8
> <
> :
yt￿=2 if ￿ < 1
yt=(2￿) if ￿ ￿ 1
(7)
and thus, substituting (6) and (7) into (4), I get the equilibrium expected proﬁts
￿
￿ =
8
> <
> :
y(1 ￿ t) + ￿yt=2 if ￿ < 1
y [1 ￿ t=(2￿)] if ￿ ￿ 1
. (8)
Given the detection technology, the expected fraction of unreported liability, y￿x￿, that is discov-
ered in case of auditing is
y Z
x
(^ y ￿ x
￿)h(^ y)d^ y=(y ￿ x
￿) = ￿=2, (9)
i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded value over true import value. The assump-
tion is thus that it is relatively easy to get away with evasion, as an audit is quite ineffective. For
example, when 30% of import value is concealed, only 15% of evasion is, on average, detected in
case of auditing. This captures the low administrative capacity that characterizes many developing
countries.
3 Multiplicative tax base
Here I take into account the fact that in case of trade tariffs the tax base, i.e. the import value, is
the product of two parameters, unit value and quantity, and each of them has to be reported to the
tax authority. The detection technology in each dimension is the same as the one outlined in the
previous section.
The true values of the two parameters are y1 and y2. For each of them, the ﬁrm has to de-
cide how much to report to the custom authority, so that x1 2 [0;y1] is the declared value of the
7ﬁrst parameter and x2 2 [0;y2] is the declared value of the second one. In case of an audit, the
custom authority manages to impute ^ x1 2 [0;y1] and ^ x2 2 [0;y2]. The probabilities of detec-
tion are assumed to be independent and uniformly distributed over the relevant intervals, so that
g^ x1(^ x1) = 1=y1 and g^ x2(^ x2) = 1=y2 and the corresponding cdf. are indicated as G^ x1 and G^ x2.
These assumptions allow to get closed form solutions. The assumption of independence is reason-
able when the two parameters are import quantity and unit value, as the evidence to be produced
by the custom authority to prove a higher import quantity (e.g. container inspection) is likely to be
unrelated to evidence needed to prove higher unit value (e.g. comparison with listed prices). I will
discuss in the last section the uniform distribution assumption.
The imposed ﬁne, f, depends on the detected and declared values of both parameters. In
particular, it is possible to distinguish four cases:
1. ^ x1 < x1 and ^ x2 < x2 ) f = 0
2. ^ x1 < x1 and ^ x2 > x2 ) f = t￿(^ x2 ￿ x2)x1
3. ^ x1 > x1 and ^ x2 < x2 ) f = t￿(^ x1 ￿ x1)x2
4. ^ x1 > x1 and ^ x2 > x2 ) f = t￿(^ x1^ x2 ￿ x1x2):
In the ﬁrst case, no evasion is discovered in either dimension and, thus, no penalty is imposed.
In cases 2 and 3, underreporting is discovered in one dimension only and the ﬁne is imposed on
assessed underreporting in that dimension multiplied by the declared value on the other dimension.
In the last case, evasion is discovered in both dimensions. Notice that when evasion is unidimen-
sional, a greater declaration has the advantage of reducing the expected ﬁne, but the disadvantage
of paying a higher tax. When a second dimension is involved, there is a further disadvantage in
that a higher declaration in one dimension increases the ﬁne when evasion in the other dimen-
sion is detected. This is evident in cases 2 and 3 above. This means that an importer will take
into account, when deciding about the declared unit value of the goods, that, if evasion about the
quantity of imported goods is detected by custom ofﬁcials, while the unit value declaration goes
unchallenged, then the value of discovered evasion, and therefore the ﬁne, will be assessed using
the declared unit value.
8Given a declaration (x1;x2), the expected ﬁne is
f = t￿
2
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
y1 Z
x1
y2 Z
x2
(^ x1^ x2 ￿ x1x2)g(^ x1; ^ x2)d^ x1d^ x2 + x2G^ x2(x2)
y1 Z
x1
(^ x1 ￿ x1)g^ x1(^ x1)d^ x1+
+x1G^ x1(x1)
y2 Z
x2
(^ x2 ￿ x2)g^ x2(^ x2)d^ x2
3
7 7 7 7 7
7
5
; (10)
where g(^ x1; ^ x2) = g^ x1(^ x1)g^ x2(^ x2). Given the assumption that the distributions are uniform, the
expected ﬁne is equal to:
f = t￿
￿￿
y
2
2 + x
2
2
￿
(y
2
1 + x
2
1) ￿ 4y1x1y2x2
￿
=(4y1y2): (11)
I can rewrite the expression above as
f
y1y2
=
t￿
4
"￿
1 ￿
x1x2
y1y2
￿2
+
￿
x1
y1
￿
x2
y2
￿2#
; (12)
where it is evident how the ﬁne depends on the total amount of evasion and on the difference
between evasion in the two dimensions. If the ﬁrm chooses to declare x1 and x2, then expected
proﬁts are
￿ = y1y2 ￿ x1x2t ￿ ￿f; (13)
where f is given by (11). Therefore, the optimal declaration is given by:
(x
￿
1;x
￿
2) s:t: max
x12[0;y1];x22[0;y2]
y1y2 ￿ x1x2t ￿ ￿f: (14)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are simultaneously satisﬁed if and only if
x
￿
1 = y1
2 p
1 ￿ 2￿ x
￿
2 = y2
2 p
1 ￿ 2￿; (15)
where ￿ = 1=(￿￿). To have an interior solution, it is necessary that ￿ < 1=2, otherwise full eva-
9sion in both dimensions takes place. In what follows, it is assumed that ￿ < 1=2, i.e. enforcement
is sufﬁciently strong to avoid full evasion. The maximand is locally concave at (x￿
1;x￿
2); however,
it is not globally concave. In the Appendix it is shown that (x￿
1;x￿
2) is indeed the global maximum
point. The same portion
2 p
1 ￿ 2￿ of the true product is declared in both dimensions. Given the
total amount of evasion, it is evident from (12) and (13) that the only effect of declaring an un-
equal portion along the two dimensions is to increase the expected ﬁne and, therefore, the optimal
behavior is to equalize them. This property is due to the assumption of an uniform distribution for
the probability of detection along the two dimensions, but it is not important for any of the results.
The fraction of unreported liability that is discovered in equilibrium is ￿=2 and the expected
ﬁne is given by
￿f = ￿ty1y2 (16)
giving expected proﬁts of
￿
￿ = y1y2(1 ￿ t) + ￿y1y2t: (17)
As underlined at the beginning of this section, with a multiplicative tax base there is an addi-
tional incentive to underreport along one dimension as a higher declaration increases the ﬁne when
evasionintheotherdimensionisdetected. Tooseehowthisisindeedthecase, considerwhatwould
happen if the taxpayer disregarded the fact that the two dimensions of the tax base are linked and
instead considered them in isolation. Then, evasion along each dimension would equal evasion in
the unitary case, giving a total declaration of (1 ￿ ￿)
2 y1y2. As (1 ￿ ￿)
2 > 1 ￿ 2￿, it is evident
that taking into account the fact that the two dimensions are related increases underreporting.
4 Comparison
In this section, I investigate the implications of a multiplicative tax base by comparing the results
derived above to the unitary case. I will ﬁrst look at the ﬁrm decision and then at the impact on
government revenues.
10Table 1 summarizes the comparison between the two cases. The proportion of the tax liability
that is declared, the voluntary compliance rate, is clearly higher in case of an unitary tax base.
The proportion of tax liability that is paid through enforcement, the ﬁne rate, is instead higher
for a multiplicative tax base. Taking both voluntary compliance and enforcement into account, a
taxpayer manages to reduce total payments to the ﬁscal authority more effectively with a multi-
plicative tax base than with an unitary one. Indeed, with a multiplicative tax base, the taxpayer
succeeds through tax evasion to reduce the proportion of the tax base that is paid to ﬁscal authori-
ties, the effective tax rate, by a factor of ￿ compared to what he should have paid, the statutory tax
rate. In the unitary case this reduction is only by a factor of ￿=2.
Table 1: Comparison
Unitary Multiplicative
Voluntary compliance rate 1 ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 2￿
Fine rate ￿=2 ￿
Effective tax rate/Statutory tax rate 1 ￿ ￿=2 1 ￿ ￿
As underlined above, given the same enforcement parameters, in an audit more evasion is
uncovered on average with a multiplicative tax base than with an unitary one. This does not imply
that a multiplicative tax base is easier to detect than an unitary one, maybe because two parameters
instead of one have to be reported to the tax authority. Actually, the opposite is true. In the unitary
case, from (5) we have
f
y
=
t￿
2
￿
1 ￿
x
y
￿2
;
comparing it with (12) when the same proportion is evaded along the two dimensions, it is evident
that for a given proportion of undeclared income, more is uncovered in the unitary case compared
to the multiplicative one. The higher ﬁne rate in the multiplicative case is simply due to higher
evasion.
To look at the impact of a multiplicative tax base on public ﬁnances, consider that net revenues
include both revenues due to voluntary compliance, x, and revenues due to enforcement, f. While
11it may be reasonable to assume that 1 USD paid by the importing ﬁrm through voluntary com-
pliance translates into 1 USD net revenue for the custom authority, in the case of revenues due to
enforcement this is less likely to be the case. Indeed, part of the costs that are labelled as a ﬁne
may be of nonpecuniary nature, like, for instance, reputational costs (Gordon, 1989), or part of
the payments in case some evasion is detected may not translate into increased revenues for the
tax authority, e.g. when bribes are paid to custom inspectors to reduce or eliminate the liability.
Therefore, I will assume that only a portion ￿ 2 [0;1] of the ﬁne represents a net revenue for the
custom authority.6 Alternatively, the authority may have an objective function such that revenues
due to voluntary compliance may be preferred to revenues due to enforcement, due for instance to
some underlying government social welfare function that emphasize the "carrot" over the "stick"
(Frey and Holler, 1998). Therefore, net revenues for the custom authority are given by
T = tx + ￿￿f: (18)
When ￿ = 1 net revenues for the custom authority are given by the tax base minus proﬁts. To com-
pare the unitary and multiplicative tax bases in terms of their budgetary implications, consider that
voluntary compliance is lower with a multiplicative tax base than with an unitary one. Moreover,
proﬁts for the importer are higher with a multiplicative tax base than with an unitary one, so, even
when ￿ = 1, the increase in ﬁnes is not enough to compensate for the decrease in voluntary com-
pliance in terms of net revenues. Therefore, in general net revenues are lower with a multiplicative
tax base than with an unitary one. I summarize these results in the following proposition
Proposition 1 In an environment with imperfect detection of tax evasion, a tax base that is the
product of two different parameters is subject to higher underreporting compared to a tax base
that can be assessed directly. As a result, expected ﬁnes are greater and expected net revenues are
6Of course, costs associated with compliance, like time spent on ﬁlling returns and money spent on professional
assistance may be relevant (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984). However, evasion may require these activities to even a greater
extent. For what follows, it would be immaterial to consider that only a portion of voluntary compliance translates into
net revenues for the custom authority, while 1 ￿ ￿ is the additional loss associated with collecting revenues through
enforcement.
12lower.
To summarize, from the previous analysis it emerges that a tax whose base is the product
of different factors, each of them declared to and assessed by the tax authority, is more difﬁcult
to enforce for the tax authority compared to a tax whose base is directly assessed. This should
be taken into consideration when deciding on which base to levy a tax. Yet, whether a given
base can be directly assessed or not could be seen as a "technological" constraint over which the
tax authority has no control. One possibility, however, is to require an unitary declaration of a
multiplicative tax base. This amounts to ask the taxpayer to report not the different factors, but
only their product. For the case of import tariffs, this implies that instead of asking the importer
to declare both the unit value and the taxable quantities, the custom authority requires only the
declaration of the total value of the merchandise. Clearly, an unitary declaration of a multiplicative
tax base reduces the amount of information available to the tax authority and, thus, should make
enforcement less effective. However, it also counter the disincentive to declare represented by
the fact that a higher declaration in one dimension increases the ﬁne when evasion in the other
dimension is detected. In what follows, I will investigate the equilibrium when a multiplicative tax
base is subject to an unitary declaration and compare it to the other cases analyzed above.
5 Unitary declaration of a multiplicative tax base
As in the previous section, the tax base is the product of two parameters and their true values are
y1 and y2, so that the tax base is y = y1y2. However, it is not the case anymore that each of
the two parameters making up the tax base has to be reported to the tax authority. Instead, the
taxpayer reports directly the tax base, x. In case of an auditing, detection takes place along the two
dimensions, so that the tax authority manages to impute ^ x1 2 [0;y1] and ^ x2 2 [0;y2], as in section
3. Now, instead of (10), the ﬁne is given by
f = t￿
y1 Z
0
y2 Z
0
max[^ x1^ x2 ￿ x;0]g(^ x1; ^ x2)d^ x1d^ x2: (19)
13This captures the fact that, given the assessed values along the two dimensions, the tax authority
imposes a ﬁne only if their product is greater than the declared amount. An equivalent expression
for the ﬁne is
f = t￿
y1 Z
x
y2
y2 Z
x
^ x1
(^ x1^ x2 ￿ x)g(^ x1; ^ x2)d^ x1d^ x2; (20)
that gives rise to the following expression, where y1y2 has been replaced by y,
f =
t￿
y
￿
y2
4
￿ xy ￿
x2
2
￿
ln
x
y
￿
+
3
4
x
2
￿
: (21)
Then, the optimal declaration is given by
x
￿ s:t: max
x2[0;y]
y ￿ ￿f ￿ tx; (22)
where the expression for the ﬁne is given by (21). The ﬁrst order condition is
x
y
￿
x
y
￿
ln
x
y
￿
= (1 ￿ ￿): (23)
The second order condition,
￿
ln x
y
￿
< 0, is always satisﬁed. The expression above does not have
an analytical solution. It is possible, however, to compare the proportion of the tax base that is
declared in the different cases. To do this, notice that the left-hand side of expression (23) is
increasing in x
y at a decreasing rate. The function is plotted in ﬁgure (1). The point on the x-axis
corresponding to the intersection between this curve and the horizontal line representing (1 ￿ ￿)
is the equilibrium declaration. We will indicate this point as x￿￿.
Comparison to an unitary tax base Recall from (6) that in case of an unitary tax base x
y =
(1 ￿ ￿). As ￿x
y
￿
ln x
y
￿
> 0, then the solution to (23) has to be strictly smaller than (1 ￿ ￿), i.e.
the share of the tax base that is declared is less than in the case of an unitary tax base. Graphically
(see ﬁgure 1), the solution to the unitary case is the intersection between the horizontal line and
the "unitary line" and this is always to the right of x￿￿.
14Figure 1: Comparison to an unitary tax base
Comparison to a standard two dimensional tax base Recall that in case of a standard two
dimensional tax base x
y = 1 ￿ 2￿. To know how this compare to x￿￿, we can calculate the value
of the left-hand side of expression (23) when x
y = 1 ￿ 2￿ and see if it is smaller or bigger than
(1 ￿ ￿). If it is smaller, it means that x￿￿ > 1￿2￿, if it is bigger it means that x￿￿ < 1￿2￿. The
comparison
1 ￿ 2￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2￿)ln(1 ￿ 2￿) > 1 ￿ ￿
gives the following condition
￿ < ￿(1 ￿ 2￿)ln(1 ￿ 2￿)
In ﬁgure (2), the two sides are plotted.
Let’s indicate as ￿￿ ’ 0:36 the point on the x-axis corresponding to the intersection between
the two curves. Then,
x￿￿ < 1 ￿ 2￿ if ￿ < ￿￿
x￿￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 2￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿￿
:
15Figure 2: Comparison to a multiplicative tax base
This implies that in an environment with low enforcement, i.e. high ￿, voluntary compliance with
taxation of a multiplicative tax base is higher when only the product of the two parameters needs to
be declared compared to the case when both parameters need to be declared. To give an example,
consider the case with ￿ = 0:4. Then, declaration in the standard multiplicative case is given by
1 ￿ 2￿ = 0:2, while declaration in case of an unitary declaration of a multiplicative tax base is
given by x￿￿ ’ 0:25.
From the point of view of the tax authority, the relevant comparison is between net revenues, as
deﬁned in (18), or equivalently, the ratio of net revenues over the true tax liability, T=(ty), provided
by the two possible institutional arrangements. By using (15) and (16), we get
T
ty
= (1 ￿ 2￿) + ￿￿
for the case of a multiple declaration, while for the case of an unitary declaration it is possible to
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Figure 3: Difference in Revenues
show that
T
ty
=
x
y
(1 ￿ ￿=2) +
￿
4￿
￿
1 ￿
x
y
￿2
; (24)
where x=y solves (23). Figure 3 plots T
ty with an unitary declaration minus T
ty with a multiple
declaration and reveals that for high enough ￿ and low enough ￿, net revenues are indeed greater
with an unitary declaration compared to a multiple declaration. For instance, when ￿ = 0:4 and
￿ = 0:1, 24% of the true tax liability translates into tax revenues with a multiple declaration, while
this is 27.5% in case of an unitary declaration.
I summarize the results in the following proposition
Proposition 2 Given a tax base that is the product of two different parameters, in an environment
with low enforcement voluntary compliance is higher when only the product of the two parameters
needs to be declared compared to the case when both parameters need to be declared. Moreover,
if penalties paid by the taxpayer translate into budgetary revenues at a low enough rate, then net
revenues are higher with an unitary declaration.
176 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, I have analyzed the implications of a feature of import tariffs that has not been
considered so far, i.e. the fact that the tax base is the product of two factors, unit value and quantity,
each of them to be reported by the importer and to be assessed by the custom authority in case of
an audit. What I have shown is that when the tax base presents this characteristic instead of being
assessed directly, as in the unitary case, then evasion is higher. I have also shown under which
circumstances a revenue maximizing custom authority may not require the importer to declare
both factors, but only their product. As mentioned in the introduction, tariff evasion can also take
place trough mislabelling of higher taxed products as lower-taxed products. The model can be
easily reinterpreted as studying evasion through mislabelling and either underreporting of quantity
or underreporting of unit price, with the caveat that mislabelling is better modelled as a discrete
rather than continuous choice. 7
For analytical tractability, the probabilities of detection have been assumed to be uniformly
distributed over the relevant intervals. In reality, it may well be the case that detection along
some dimensions is relatively easy, so that the probability of detection is skewed toward zero,
while in other dimensions detection may be relatively difﬁcult, with a probability skewed toward
the true value. In this case, the proportion of evasion along each dimension would no longer be
identical. The empirical evidence concerning the relative importance of the different channels
through which tariff evasion takes place, i.e. quantity, unit price, misclassiﬁcation, is rather mixed:
Fisman and Wei (2004) ﬁnd evidence of misclassiﬁcation and underreporting of unit values, but not
of quantities. Javorcik and Narciso (2008) ﬁnd that evasion takes place through misrepresentation
of import prices, but not through misclassiﬁcation or undereporting of quantities, while Mishra
et al. (2008) ﬁnd evasion in quantities to be signiﬁcant. Jean and Mitaritonna (2010) ﬁnd that
7Moreover, at the cost of losing analytical tractability, the analysis can be extended to a tax base that is the product
of three independently reported parameters. In this case, the f.o.c. for each of the three dimensions is given by
￿
xi
yi
￿2
+ 1 = 2
p
(1 ￿ ￿)
r
xi
yi
i = 1;2;3:
18underreporting of both quantities and unit price are "widespread modalities of custom evasion,
with comparable importance". The generally bad quality of quantity data in trade statistics8 makes
the identiﬁcation of the different channels difﬁcult. However, the lack of symmetry in evasion
along different dimensions would not hinder the intuition behind the main results of the paper,
namely that with a multiplicative tax base there is an additional incentive to underreport due to
the fact that a higher declaration in one dimension increases the expected ﬁne when evasion in the
other dimension is detected, and that an unitary declaration may improve voluntary compliance as
it mitigates this disincentive to underreport.
The additional incentive to underreport in case of a multiplicative tax base highlighted in this
paper has implications for the issue of crime displacement, i.e. the tendency of higher enforce-
ment along one dimension to increase criminal activity in alternative dimensions. In the context
of tariffs, Yang (2008) has shown that increased enforcement in the Philippinnes (preshipment in-
spection of imports for a subset of countries) led to an increase in an alternative method of duty
evasion (shipping via duty-exempt export processing zones), so that total duty avoidance did not
change. In terms of the decision analyzed in this paper, improving compliance along one dimen-
sion, say unit price, through higher enforcement, increases the expected ﬁne when evasion along
the other dimension, quantity, is detected, thus encouraging a higher declaration. Thus, with a
multiplicative tax base, the interdependence between the different dimensions actually generates a
positive feedback instead of displacement.
From a policy perspective, tariffs have been used by developing countries to raise revenues
because they beneﬁt from low collection costs compared to other taxes (Riezman and Slemrod,
1987) and it has been argued that they may be part of the optimal tax structure in developing
countries, where tax enforcement is more difﬁcult (Gordon and Li, 2009). However, what has
been underlined in this paper is that, in environments with low administrative capacity, custom
duties may be actually more difﬁcult to enforce than other taxes and this should be taken into
8Quantities are often indicated for information only (Jean and Mitaritonna, 2010) and the unit of measurements
reported by different statistical agencies may be non-convertible, e.g. units vs. kilograms (Stoyanov, 2009). See also
Rozanski and Yeats (1994) for a comprehensive analysis of the reliability of trade statistics.
19account when thinking about the optimal tax structure for developing countries.
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7 Appendix
To establish whether (x￿
1;x￿
2) is indeed the global maximum point, it is necessary to check the
value of the function along the boundaries.
First, I analyse the boundaries within the axes, i.e. with full evasion in at least one dimension.
1 . Substituting x1 = 0 in (13), I get ￿jx1=0 = y1y2￿t(y2
2 + x2
2)y1=(4￿y2), that is maximized
for x2 = 0;
2. Substituting x2 = 0 in (13), I get ￿jx2=0 = y1y2 ￿ t(y2
1 + x2
1)y2=(4￿y1), that is maximized
for x1 = 0;
Thus, when there is total evasion in one dimension, then it is also optimal to have total evasion
in the other dimension. A positive declaration would only represent a lower bound on the ﬁne to be
paid. Therefore, we need to compare ￿￿ given by (17) with proﬁts corresponding to total evasion
given by substituting x1 = 0;x2 = 0 in (13):
￿
￿
bm = y1y2 ￿ ￿t￿y1y2=4: (25)
22For ￿ < 1=2; we always have that ￿￿ > ￿￿
bm.
The case with full compliance in at least one dimension is parallel to the case analyzed in the
unitary case.
3. In case x1 = y1, then ￿ is maximized for x2 = (1 ￿ ￿)y2, resulting in proﬁts ￿￿jx1=y1 =
y1y2(1 ￿ t) + ￿ty1y2=2;
4. In case x2 = y2, then ￿ is maximized for x1 = (1 ￿ ￿)y1, resulting in the same proﬁts as in
the previous case.
Thus, proﬁts when there is total compliance in one dimension are given by ￿￿
fc = ￿￿jx1=y1 =
￿￿jx2=y2. It is straightforward to show that ￿￿ > ￿￿
fc.
So, the analysis at the boundaries shows that (x￿
1;x￿
2) is indeed the global maximum point.
23